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1 Abstract 
The paper challenges the current common rankings of economies when measured over 
the GDP, and introduces a set of new Indices based on the factors GDP, Gini Coefficient 
and Inflation. This Social factors relativized GDP cuts out that part of the GDP, which is 
structurally long term frozen up by social transfers. Furthermore, the paper introduces an 
economic model that implements the future aspect into the GDP over the factors of 
change in capital expenditures and change in private investments. The first part of the pa-
per explains the κ_Index models, the factors that were applied, as well as the reasons for 
the choice. The second part of the paper shows variations of the κ_Index including a few 
ideal-typical examples. The final part asks some critical questions and concludes the pa-
per.   
 
Basic social factors relativized GDP: κ _Index = GDP – GDP x Gini is (1 – GINI) x GDP   
Inflation indexed Version:    κ _Index_Infl. = (1 – Gini – Inflation) x GDP  
Future aspect of GDP 
With Private Investment variable: κp = (B + B × ∆P) – (B × G) 
With Private Investment variable and inflation: κip = (B + B × ∆P) - [(B × G)+(B × In)] 
 
Productivity Index:    κ_PROD = κ_Index / Labor Force = κ_PROD 
Inflation indexed Productivity Index: κ_PROD_Infl. = κ_Index_Infl. / Labor Force   
 
Debt-to- κ _Index κ _Debt = National debt / κ_Index  
Debt-to- κ _Index_Inflation κ _Debt_Infl. = National debt / κ_Index_Infl. 
 
JEL Classification: E010, E10, O11, C02, C01, E01, F02, C10, C50 
 
Keywords: Econometric Modelling, Economic Indicator, Macro Models, International Economic Or-
der, GDP, GNP, GINI, Productivity, Capital Expenditure, Private Investment, Inequality, Income Dis-
tribution, Poverty Growth, Poverty Measurement, International Industrial Order, Econometrics, 
Econometric Methods, , Macroeconometrics, Mathematical Methods, Mathematical Models, 
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2 The Problem 
Questioning the measurement of economies by GDP alone is not new. Economists, from 
Nobel Prize winning Joseph E. Stiglitz to less well-known scientists, were internationally 
looking for a way to get away from the “GDP fetishism”1, or to deal with the weak-
nesses2 of the GDP3. These efforts went so far, that many considered replacing it with al-
ternatives4 like the Gross National Happiness5. Graham for instance quit the attempt to 
define the GNH Index with an open-ended book6, while Stiglitz for instance attempted to 
create a broader version of the GDP7 for a more comprehensive approach8.  
 
If necessary social transfer payments permanently freeze a part of the GDP, why not 
make this permanently visible and directly comparable in the GDP? It does relativize the 
factually available economic means. 
 
How can economies be measured more realistically while keeping the complexity of the 
index practical?9 To solve this difficult task, which contains a target conflict in itself, 
only highly aggregated factors can be considered. This paper logically and coherently 
models the GDP with the introduction of the factors of the Gini coefficient and the factor 
of Inflation. For dealing with the future aspect of the GDP10, the factors of change in 
capital expenditure and in the factor of change of private investments have been intro-
duced.  
 
                                                 
1
 The Guardian (2009): Sarkozy attacks focus on economic growth, under 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/sep/14/sarkozy-attacks-gdp-focus 
2
 Stiglitz proposes five fixes for the “deficiencies of the GDP (as an indicator for living standards)”, Stiglitz 
J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Perform-
ance and Social Progress,p.22 
3
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.22 
4
 Beyond-GDP (2013): Indicators, Enlarged GDP, Social Indicators, under http://www.beyond-
gdp.eu/indicatorList.html?indicator=Enlarged_GDP . Countless further statistical indicators try in principle 
the same. For instance the Human Development Index HDI (with a strong emphasis on social factors), as 
well as indices from the World Economic Forum.  
5
 Especially in the recent economical crisis 
6
 Mainly due to problems of measuring the multi-dimensionality of well-being,  
Graham C. (2011):The Pursuit of Happiness. An economy of Well-being, p.125-126. Also described in 
Stiglitz proposes five fixes for the “deficiencies of the GDP (as an indicator for living standards)”, Stiglitz 
J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Perform-
ance and Social Progress,p.14-15 and Fleurbaey M. (2008):Individual well-being and social welfare: Notes 
on the theory, p.23-24 
7
 With fixing the GDP issues + Quality of Life measurement + Environment and Sustainability 
8
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress, p.21-85 
9
 Which index has the right balance between measuring economical strength while being more comprehen-
sive and statistically adequate than the GDP alone? 
10
 Which to my knowledge has not been introduced before 
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This leads to revised rankings of nations based on the real factual means, as shown in 
ideal-typical examples.  
 
3 The Index and its Versions 
3.1 Why is the GDP not enough? 
The GDP mainly measures market production – expressed in monetary units11. It says 
nothing about the household income, and nothing about the distribution of that income 
nationwide12. It does not include unemployment or the price burden13 on the consumers, 
which can smallen disposable income significantly14.  
 
Still the GDP is treated as if it were a measure of general economic well-being15. This 
leads to a perceived reality-gap between GDP Data and the experienced well-being of the 
people. This happens especially when focusing on growth (of the GDP). Figure 1 defines 
growth as additional economic activity16. It shows the reduced economical activities and 
its possible reasons as cutouts.    
 
To get away from this “growth fetishism”17 Stiglitz argues that disposable income18 of 
nations and households is more suited to measure economic well-being. “Material living 
standards are more closely associated with measures of net national income, real house-
hold income and consumption – production can expand while income decreases or vice 
versa when account is taken of depreciation, income flows into and out of a country, and 
differences between the prices of output and the prices of consumer products….citizens’ 
material living standards are better followed through measures of household income and 
consumption”19. This predestines income indices for expansion of the GDP. This turns 
the Gini coefficient into a valid choice.  
                                                 
11
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.12-13 
12
 “If inequality increases enough relative to the increase in average per Capital GDP, most people can be 
worse off even though average income is increasing”, Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by 
the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress,p.8 
13
 Inflation 
14
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.12-13 
15
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.21 
16
 Similar to Stiglitz`s definition of economical activity. Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report 
by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress,p.11 
17
 The Guardian (2009): Sarkozy attacks focus on economic growth, under 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/sep/14/sarkozy-attacks-gdp-focus 
18
 Available for expenses 
19
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.13 
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Figure 1 Growth visualized with its influencing factors20 
                                                 
20
 Own creation with a table from Shadowstats.com (2012): under 
http://www.shadowstats.com/alternate_data/gross-domestic-product-charts 
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3.2 GDP - GDP × Gini  
κ _Index =(1 – GINI)  × GDP  
 
GINI21 measuring the long term cause for social transfers, which freeze a part of the 
GDP already. 
 
The GINI-coefficient is a highly aggregated statistical measure for income inequality. 
The incomes of a Nation are put in relation with an absolutely even distribution of all in-
comes22. Figure two shows this graphically with the squared surface between the Lorenz 
curve and the 45° even. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The GINI23 
 
As described in the chapter before it makes sense to expand the GDP with an income 
measure. However, why doing so with an inequality measure that shows24 the income 
                                                 
21
 Why would you want to mix this coefficient into the “holye” GDP? 
22
 Hohlstein, Michael (2003): Lexikon der Volkswirtschaft, p.317 
23
 Hohlstein, Michael (2003): Lexikon der Volkswirtschaft, p.317 
24
 highly aggregated 
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distribution of a nation? “Over the past two decades, the dominant pattern in OECD 
countries is one of a fairly widespread increase in income inequality, with strong rises in 
Finland, Norway, Sweden (from a low base) and Germany, Italy, New Zealand, and 
the United States (from a high base)”25.  
 
Main Axiom: Higher income inequality = higher long-term pressure to increase public 
social spending, especially in developed nations. 
 
Social expenses have to occur26 due to problems27 caused by inequality. The Gini coeffi-
cient measures indirectly the long-term pressures on the economy, which require social 
transfer payments28. Since economical policy29 is often short term and not truly compa-
rable in detail30, the Gini coefficient is. Most countries spend about 20% - 30% of their 
income for public social spending31. These social expenses32 are more or less33 fixed 
costs in any GDP. The true GDP is therefore “de facto” relativized already downwards 
by this fixed-spending-factuality on the ground. Figure 3 shows public social spending in 
percent of the GDP by OECD nations34. The public pension expenditures have to be 
added to these numbers.   
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.33 
26
 At least partially 
27
 Multiplier effects. For instance well paying jobs with positive multiplier effects, while unemployment 
creates negative multiplier effects (i.e. not just opportunity costs like lost taxes but external effects as well 
like dealing with crime) 
28
 These may be structurally underfunded or overfunded compared to the needs of the society based on the 
inequality pressures, making the society (and economy) structurally more or less prone to misery (visible or 
covert). 
29
 If for instance (when designing a new indicator) simply choosing the percentage of GDP paid for social 
matters, those countries which pay less to social transfers would keep a higher GDP. You would need an 
inverse ranking logic when you want to measure economic strength. This and the short term timeframes 
for economical policy makes a social expenses based index problematic. 
30
 Democracies may have more difficulties in cutting social expenses than less democratic systems. Phi-
losophical or historical aspects (like Calvinism in Anglo-American societies) decide as well how high these 
expenses should be. The living standards these payments create may be also not easily comparable- besides 
all the problems with statistical adequation (i.e. what you measured -and how vs. what you wanted to meas-
ure). 
31
 OECD (2013): Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), under 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/socialexpendituredatabasesocx.htm 
32
 Including public pensions 
33
 Depends on the grade of democratization and tradition of protest (for instance very common in France, 
but not very well liked in Germany) 
34
 OECD (2013): Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), under 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/socialexpendituredatabasesocx.htm 
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Income inequality can be distinguished and measured by many ways. The methods vary 
besides the Gini Coefficient from Theil Indices, to Pareto Distributions to Big-Mac Indi-
ces. Generally, inequality can be a massive expansion of income of a few households or 
persons at the very top, while keeping most household income steady or it can be a rela-
tive decrease of household wealth for the broad population. Arguably latter is economi-
cally worse to catastrophic for any economy.  
  
 
Figure 3 Public social spending based on detailed data for 1960-2009; national aggregates for 2010-
2012 and estimates for 2013, in percentage of GDP35 
 
“Income flows are an important gauge for the standard of living, but in the end it is 
Consumption and consumption possibilities over time that matter. The time dimension 
brings in wealth”36. The very same time dimension brings long-term necessities to fund 
inequality-based problems, is therefore a negative income flow/ decreased consumption 
possibility (i.e. costs wealth long term).   
 
If necessary social transfer payments permanently use up a part of the GDP, why not 
make this permanently visible and directly comparable in the GDP? It does relativize the 
factually available economic means downwards. Countries tend to cover these expendi-
ture pressures with additional debt, that is why it does not seem to matter. However, these 
debts must be paid later on, despite the remaining underlying pressures. (The details of 
downgrading a currency to deflate the real debts are not in this model.)  
  
                                                 
35
 OECD (2013): Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), under 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/socialexpendituredatabasesocx.htm 
36
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.29 
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The κ_Index ranks with the introduction of the Gini coefficient the less developed nation 
a lot lower, and the developed nation moderately lower, depends on how well the income 
is distributed. Structurally underfunding the necessary public social payments will not 
help the States in these rankings.   
 
This index is vaguely related to the national accounts measure “Net national disposable 
income (as percentage of gross domestic product)” that Stiglitz proposes37, but is more 
practical due to the highly aggregated but internationally accepted factors.  
 
Less developed economies tend to have a higher inequality index. 
 
Economists tend to view those Economies as healthier, which have a population and 
workforce, which can afford goods and services38. This is also known as domestic de-
mand driven economy39. Import- and export-balance is a further relevant factor for long-
term stability, since deficit equals debt or additional taxation.  
 
Economies that are mostly exporting raw materials have often a high GDP, while their 
people are poor, cannot afford goods or services, and an often corrupt elite finds ways to 
cut its share off the income from the exports. The country is looted, very few get very 
rich, but the people generally are chanceless and miserable. 
 
When it comes to GDP, both nations are equal.  
 
If they shouldn’t be equal, because it does not represent the factual reality on the ground, 
how do we sort these nations scientifically, logically consistent while staying practical 
and relevant enough?  
 
 Ideal-typical example: What oil price does an energy exporting country40 need, to fi-
nance its social programs? Moreover, why not ask this question from the metaphoric “tail 
of the horse” over the inequality Index, with the axiom that income inequality decides 
more or less directly and long term41 about the amount of necessary transfers? 
 “For a poor developing country to be told that its GDP has gone up may be of little rele-
vance. It wants to know whether its citizens are better-off, and national income measures 
are more relevant to this question than GDP”42.  
                                                 
37
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.24, 30 
38
 The choice of Stiglitz to choose disposable income is an approach that builds on this fact.  
39
 For instance USA, OECD (2013): 1. Gross domestic product, under 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=SNA_TABLE1 
40
 For instance Russia 
41
 More long term than most economic policy timescale changes at least (usually based on election cycles) 
42
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.24 
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For the formulas κ_Index = GDP - GDP × Gini, also writeable as κ_Index = (1 – GINI)  
× GDP  we use the following variables: 
 
GDP   = B  
GINI   =  G  
κ_Index  =  κ  
 
The formulas are mathematically represented as:  
κ
43
    = B – B × G 
restated as  
κ  = (1-G)B  
 
 
  
3.3 GDP – [(GDP × GINI) + (GDP × Inflation)]  
κ_Index_Infl. =(1 – Gini – Inflation nominal) × GDP  
 
This κ_Index shows good governance over the social factors relativized GDP with the in-
terdependence between Gini and Inflation.  
 
The relativization of less healthy or underdeveloped economies44 over income distribu-
tion can, as explained above, show a more realistic ranking of nations. However, there are 
further pressures on the economy that could also help rate economies clearer. One of 
these pressures is inflation.  
 
“The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is a measure o the average change over time in the 
prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services.  
The CPI affects nearly all Americans because of the many ways it is used. Following are 
major uses: As an economic indicator, as a deflator of other economic series and as a 
means of adjusting dollar values”45. 
  
                                                 
43
 If there is such a thing as mathematical beauty then this is one of them. B – B * G or (1-G)B despite all 
its depth. 
44
 If the complete economy relies on exporting oil or ore, the whole nation becomes very dependant on pric-
ing and vulnerable to external shocks. Reagan pressured the Soviet Union with lowering the oil price, and 
while the oil price was high in the 70s, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, while once the oil price was down 
in the 80s, they had to retreat. The complete raw materials exports of the whole empire basically barely 
topped the years earning of just one of many American multi nationals (like GE) at the time.  
45
 Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013): Consumer Price Index, under 
http://stats.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm#Question_1 
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Ideal typical examples (based on homo oeconomicus): It is viewed by the “tiny homo 
Oeconomicus” (the individual) as “everything got so expensive” or as “why is so much 
month left over at the end of the paycheck, it was enough earlier...” or “…what? 
Grandpa? Cinema for 50 cents in 1950?”. For the “large homo Oeconomicus” (the Inves-
tors, Companies) it means the investment made does not pay off anymore, the profit is 
eaten up by inflation, or the savings need an investment method at least above this infla-
tion level. For the “supersized homo Oeconomicus” (the States) it means on one hand 
cheaper exports, and on the other hand more expensive imports. So it depends if you have 
a balanced trade budget46, or if you are an export driven nation47, or if you are an im-
porter (for instance of energy), the effects mean something good or bad to you48.  
 
Generally, inflation is viewed as not good by most economical actors and economists, 
certainly not in the long run.  
 
Including the factor of inflation in the relativization of the GDP is meant to downgrade 
nations that undermine the spending power/buying power of its people or gambles with 
its fiscal stability, while ranking those that act responsibly above the irresponsible. In any 
case it is too important (on too many levels) to be simply ignored if the GDP should be 
more realistic. The more broken the economy, the more relevant this factor becomes, 
since Inflation that is out of control is typically not a simple external shock, but is often 
caused by longstanding structural problems49. Those hit hardest are not so much investors 
that can relocate, but the weaker social layers like elderly, which cannot50. These persons 
get a share of the GDP over income re-distribution from public social payments.  
 
High inflation relativizes the social transfer payments51 (the receiving persons get) 
downwards, but amplifies countless negative external effects that are caused by misery in 
an economy (and society), while causing the necessity for even more substantive transfer 
payments.  
 
Second hypothesis: The Gini coefficient and Inflation are interdependent if the relativiza-
tion of the GDP towards realism is the goal.  
 
                                                 
46
 Italy for instance 
47
 Japans famed Abenomics devalued the Japanese currency Yen to make the exports cheaper and to leave a 
decade long stagnation over export surpluses.  
48
 The mechanism of artificially downgrading the currency to make the nation and its products cheaper is 
important for “staying in the game” of export, attract investments etc. There are furthermore anticipation 
games, when all expect things to get cheaper tomorrow you don’t spend today, but when you know its more 
expensive tomorrow and the savings are less valuable then you’re likely to invest today. 
49
 It can prevent a recovery as well 
50
 Example Euro crisis: Wealthy Greeks bought the UK and German housing market empty (causing a real 
estate bubble “by the book”), while in Greece old people died on lack of affordability of medical care. 
51
 Typically a third of GDP 
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The relativization in the κ_Index is less grave than the relativization over the GINI. It can 
only serve as a pinnacle in tight rankings in cases when the countries are well governed52. 
 
For the Formulas κ_Index_Infl. = GDP – [(GDP × GINI) + (GDP × Inflation)]  and 
κ_Index_Infl. = (1 – Gini – Inflation nominal) × GDP  we introduce the additional vari-
ables of: 
 
INFLATION  nominal = In 
κ_Index_Inflation  =  κi 
 
The formulas are mathematically represented therefore as 
κi = B-[(B×G)+(B×In)] 
or also writeable as  
κi = (1-G-In)B 
 
3.4 The future aspect of the GDP 
The main index with introduction of the future aspect into the GDP 
 
The GDP is arguably based on past performance data. The introduction of the Gini coef-
ficient puts a basic measure of the pressures of social expenditures into the GDP. It has 
therefore a long-term future aspect in itself. Given the Axiom that the Gini does represent 
long-term pressures for social security expenditures, this represents the future aspect of 
the expenditures relativization side only, i.e. pressures for future long-term expenditures.  
 
For the inclusion of future income-side based pressures, a further factor is required. The 
factor of Capital Expenditures53 or the factor of Private Investment Rates. Chinas econ-
omy grew for instance mostly through FDI`s, while current Investment rates changed 
somewhat, and are to a sizeable part no longer private investments any longer. Using pri-
vate Capital as measure, excludes government distortions causing investment bubbles.  
These are often passive and non-profit-generating investments, like “ghost cities” in 
China or EU Highways into nowhere. This assumes that the factors of Capital expendi-
ture and private investment rate are generally targeted towards generating profit, and 
have a lower misallocation rate of capital.  
 
                                                 
52
 Now we have a beautiful way to measure the nations with a more realistic view of the economy. (I admit 
it, I just single handedly destroyed the beauty of GDP –GDP x Gini with the technical and quirky additional 
inflation relativization). However there are variants doable 
53
 Economist, The (2014): Corporate spending / If they build it, from July, 5th, 2014, under 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21606329-Capital-expenditure-around-world-has-
been-disappointing-if-they-build-it?fsrc=scn/tw_ec/if_they_build_it 
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Investments do not have only a limited effect on the GDP, since they have a very broad 
effect on welfare generation. Therefore, the Investment Rates must be adapted before 
other factors in the economic model alter the GDP.  
 
The future aspect of the GDP is the anticipated growth or shrinking effect of the Econ-
omy, that comes with the change in private investment or Capital Expenditures in the re-
cent timeframe i.e. a past to current change of Investment will lead to shrinking or 
growth of the Economy in the future.. 
 
The private investments occur on an already existing level of investment. This means that 
only the change of investment matters for limited prediction time frames, such as for the 
GDP. The difference or variation of these rates is called delta.  
 
It depends at which position of the Economic Model the change of these Factors (Capital 
Expenditures or Private Investments) is applied. This leads to two different model types. 
In one model the Investment Factors are applied on the GDP before the other varying 
model Factors, and in the second model, the Investment Factors are applied on the GDP 
after the varying Model Factors.  
 
The application ex-ante is more relevant. Investments affect the GDP on a broad scale, 
and not just a part of it in a relativized GDP (as would be in the second ex-post Model). 
Therefore, the second model lacks of relevance in reality.  
 
This leads to a GDP that boosts or lowers its nominal value by change of Capital Expen-
ditures or private investments, but relativizes this with the frozen up means of Social Ex-
penses as well as with the element Inflation. Latter is only relevant in unstable economies 
or bad governance economies.  
   
The mathematical modelling of this requires the introduction of further factors: 
 
Delta Private Investment   =  ∆P  
Delta Capital Expenditures   = ∆C 
κ_Index_Priave_Investment  =  κp 
κ_Index_Capital_Expenditures = κc 
κ_Index_Inflation_Private_Invest. = κip 
κ_Index_Inflation_Capital_Exp. = κic 
 
Ex-ante Model for delta Private Investment: applied on the GDP before all other factors, 
leading to the mathematical formula stated as:  
 
κp = (B + B × ∆P) – (B × G) 
 
With inflation factor: 
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κip = (B + B × ∆P) - [(B × G)+(B × In)] 
 
Ex-post Model for delta Private Investment: applied on the GDP after all other factors, 
leading to the mathematical formula stated as:   
 
κp = B – [( B × G) + (B × ∆P)] 
 
With inflation factor: 
 
κip = B - [(B×G)+(B×In)]  + {[(B×G)+(B×In)]× ∆P} 
 
 
Ex-ante Model for delta Capital Expenditures: applied on the GDP before all other fac-
tors, leading to the mathematical formula stated as:  
 
κc = (B + B × ∆C) – (B × G) 
 
With inflation factor: 
 
κic = (B + B × ∆C) - [(B × G)+(B × In)] 
 
Ex-post Model for delta Capital Expenditures: applied on the GDP after all other factors, 
leading to the mathematical formula stated as:   
 
κc = B – [( B × G) + (B × ∆C)] 
With inflation factor: 
κic = B - [(B×G)+(B×In)]  + {[(B×G)+(B×In)]× ∆C} 
 
 
3.5 GDP_per_Capita, and GNP variants 
(1 – GINI) × GDP_per_Capita 
(1 – Gini – Inflation nominal) × GDP_per_Capita 
(1 – Gini – Inflation nominal- Unemployment rate nominal) × GDP= Κ_Index_Infl._Un. 
 
(1 – GINI) × GNP  
(1 – GINI) × GNP_per_Capita 
 
Transformation of an economical power index into an inequality measurement index. 
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The advantage of this formula construction is it works as a variety of Indices. 
GDP_per_Capita, and as a retired Professor54 suggested, Gross National Product GNP55 
(or GNP_per_Capita). The advantage of the GNP is the removal of inflation with using 
real numbers. However, this modification transforms the κ _Index to an income distribu-
tion index, away from a reality adjusted national economic power index. Variants with 
the unemployment rate further downgrades nations that do not show responsible good 
governance56.  
 
This requires the Introduction of the Variables  
GDP_per_Capita  = Bc 
Gross National Product = N 
GNP_per_Capita  = Nc 
Inflation nominal  = In 
Unemployment rate nominal = Un 
κ_Index_GDP_per_Capita = κgc 
κ_Index_Infl._GDP_per_Capita = κigc 
κ_Index_GNP   = κgn 
κ_Index_GNP_per_Capita = κgp 
κ_Index_inflation_unempl. = κiu 
 
Mathematically the Formulas for GDP_per_Capita are described as: 
κgc = (1-G)Bc 
κigc = (1 – G – In)Bc 
κiu = (1 – G – In - Un)G 
κn = (1 – G)N 
κnc = (1 – G)Nc 
 
3.6 Productivity Index (κ_Index_Infl. / Labor Force)  
κ_PROD = κ_Index / Labor Force 
κ_PROD_Infl.= κ_Index_Infl. / Labor Force  
 
Theoretical value (how much) a worker creates when the GDP takes income inequality in 
account.  
 
                                                 
54
 Prof. Dr. Enke (retired) from University of applied Sciences Nuertingen and University Marburg, who I 
would love to thank for the support and encouraging me to pursue this Index further 
55
 In German it’s the bnE = Bruttonationaleinkommen 
56
 This downgrading might go too far, besides impractical complexity since there are different levels of un-
employment. (For instance frictional unemployment or the statistical values themselves, like broadness 
definitions U1 U2 etc that might not be comparable internationally). 
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Each economy is in a different state of development. The less developed an economy is, 
the less value the working force creates per work hour or per worker. A lower developed 
economy that has half of its labor force in agriculture, can barely earn a sufficient GDP, 
that is equal to that of a developed economy, where for instance the same workers create 
turbines instead of tomatoes in the same working timeframe.  
 
When the κ_Index is applied as the basis of this input-output question, the distortions 
caused by “workforce assumption” are reduced.  A nation that exports energy, has rarely 
substantial numbers of workers in that industry, but gets over the high GDP a good pro-
ductivity Index. This does not reflect realistically the situation of workforce productivity.  
 
Ideal typical example: Poor people watching a pipeline pumping billions of petro-dollars 
aside their village out of their country, until they become terrorists or sabotage it out of 
economical motives (to get some fuel), is not valid productivity (in economical sense). 
 
Since these less developed economies tend to have a higher Gini coefficient than a bal-
anced developed high-wage economy, picking the κ_Index (with its GINI) can benefit a 
more realistic assessment.  
3.7 Debt ratios K_Debt or K_Debt_Infl. 
κ_Debt =National Debt / κ_Index   
κ _Debt_Infl.= National Debt / κ_Index_Infl.  
 
Ability (of a nation) to pay its debts without cutting structurally into the social transfers. 
 
Debt-to-GDP ratios are very common in economics. Using these κ_Index and 
κ_Index_Infl. values as basis for a debt-ratio makes only sense, when there is an interest 
in a broader scope about the economy. If only the strict financial ability of a nation to 
pay its debts counts, this index is less relevant. Early warning systems that analyze the 
development path of nations might get sooner warning signs with the κ_Debt_Infl. than 
with classical debt-to-GDP ratios. This is especially the case when a nation has to cut 
deeper into the public social payments57. All values lead to technically higher debt per-
centages than with the classical debt-to-GDP ratios, since the κ_Index and κ_Index_Infl. 
generally lowers the GDP58.   
 
                                                 
57
 These measures are perceived as a positive measure in the financial sector, which means the markets 
value financial stability higher than the living standards of those at the receiving end of public social trans-
fers. 
58
 Disposable income is always lower than the original income value 
 18 
3.8 Digression A: Four-/ Five-Sector-Model  
Identifying government overheads or social sector overheads (in the economic structure)- 
with or without shadow economy. 
 
Redefining the Economical Power of Nation requires also a closer look at the structure it-
self. This section contains a small addition to the model, the separation of the Economic 
Structures into a new insight model. Analyzing the sectoral structure of economies 
shows the level of development of economies, and to a certain extent good or bad gov-
ernance. The “three sector hypothesis” segments the economy into three sectors. Primary, 
Secondary and Tertiary Sector. Economies tend to grow towards the tertiary sector, the 
higher developed the economy is. Table 1 shows the definitions of these three sectors and 
gives a brief example about the size of each sector for a developed or undeveloped econ-
omy.  
 
Restructuring the third sector and adding the fourth sector of Government and Nonprofit 
helps to identify government overheads59. If taking demographic changes of the popula-
tion in account, analyzing the economies with a separated nonprofit sector can be a useful 
modification of the three-sector-model60. Including the fifth sector of shadow economy is 
problematic due to lack of data (quantity of data). Many problems occur also in the qual-
ity of the data due to significant statistical adequation problems when measuring these 
additional sectors61.  
 
Table 2 shows the proposed sectoral structure with a brief description of each sector. 
 
Table 1 Three sector hypothesis (common) 
Sector I Extraction of raw materials + fishing (developed Nation 1-5%/ un-
developed 50% or more) 
Sector II Industry, manufacturing, construction (developed Nation 20 to 30%/ 
undeveloped 20%) 
Sector III Services (developed Nation 50% or more/ undeveloped 10%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59
 These oversizes are typical for “inflexible/ incrusted” economies or bad governance economies. For in-
stance was this characteristic for Argentina before its crisis in the 90s or Greece in the current Euro crisis. 
60
 Analyzing the Greek economy or the German economy over this model could be interesting. 
61
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.26 
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Table 2 Modified three sector hypothesis with two additional sectors and readjusted third sector 
Sector I Extraction of raw materials + fishing 
Sector II Industry, manufacturing, construction  
Sector III Services + I.T. (with communications industry) 
Sector IV State sector62 and Nonprofit (Govt. Jobs, churches, red cross etc.) 
Sector V (option) Shadow economy (problem to get correct numbers, usually 15-20% 
 
3.9  Digression B: Who should join a single currency system?  
Expenditures pressures caused debts, which depended in value on currency values. With 
the united currency system like the euro, the trade benefits should outweigh the negative 
effects of the inability to downgrade the currency. 
  
Governments tend to cover up the social expenses with debts. These must be paid back 
despite the still remaining economic pressures. Governments use many methods to still 
be able to pay the debts; one of these methods is currency downgrading. What happens 
when the country is in a currency alliance and cannot downgrade the currency? The 
economy suffers, that is consensus. So who should be therefore in a united currency sys-
tem? A Hypothesis of mine is that those should be in a currency system whose benefit 
from free Trade and joint Currency are greater or equal to the negative effects of inability 
to downgrade the currency. This is a fluid process and not a static occasion. Sometimes 
Trade benefits and single currency benefits will be higher than without a united currency, 
but sometimes the economy will suffer and the negative effects of inability to downgrade 
the currency become more relevant.  
 
When nations do not have enough free trade ongoing, to make it profitable for a nation to 
join a single currency system (i.e. NOT greater or equal negative effects) at year 1, it still 
does not meant it wont have enough trade benefits in year 10.    
 
This means the solution for the inability to downgrade a currency problem is intensified 
free trade, i.e. that the trade benefits outweigh the negative effects of inability to down-
grade the currency. 
 
This leads to the formula  
 
Trade benefits + other positive income effects and externalities of being in a single cur-
rency  ≥ negative effects and externalities of the inability to downgrade own currency63 
 
                                                 
62
 “Government output represents around 20% of GDP in many OECD countries and total government ex-
penditure more than 40% for the OECD countries”, Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by 
the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress,p.12 
63
 for instance FDI effects on reduced currency values, opportunity costs  and other externalities  
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Trade benefits      = X 
Positive external effects      = Y 
Positive externalities      = EZ  
Negative external effects    = Ny 
Negative external effects    = En  
 
X + Y + EZ  ≥  Ny + En 
 
4 Ideal-Typical Examples 
4.1 Example κ_Index and κ_Index_Infl. 
Two ideal typical countries that seem equal. Country A (less developed) and Country B 
(developed) have a GDP of 2.5 Trillion Euro each.  
 
Country A (Less developed):  
Gini 0.40 
Inflation 7% = 0.07 nominal 
Relativization 0.47 
GDP 2,500 Billion Euro 
Labor Force 42 Million people 
 
κ_Index (without Inflation):  (1 – 0.4) × 2,500bn  = 1,500bn 
κ_Index_Infl.  : (1 – 0.4 – 0.07) × 2,500bn = 1,325bn 
 
Country B: (Higher developed) 
Gini 0.28 
Inflation 2% = 0.02 nominal 
Relativization 0.3 
BIP 2,500 Billion Euro 
Labor Force 42 Million people 
 
κ_Index (without Inflation):  (1 – 0.28) × 2,500bn = 1,800bn 
κ_Index_Infl.  :  (1 – 0.28 – 0.02) × 2,500bn = 1,725bn 
 
Comparison of the results: 
Even if both nations have a similar GDP, the picture looks very different when only two 
further factors are included (Gini and Inflation). The difference between κ_Index and 
κ_Index_Infl. is small, but will be important in tight rankings. 
  
Country A (less developed) relativized GDP   :  1,325bn   
Country B (higher developed) relativized GDP  :  1,725bn  
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κp = (B + B × ∆P) – (B × G) 
 
With inflation factor: 
 
κip = (B + B × ∆P) - [(B × G)+(B × In)] 
 
The shrinking of private investment rates at 23% representing a significant shock. This is 
an extreme ideal-typical example that would severely harm any economy. The real worth 
of the economy after the shock will be:  
 
Country A (less developed) 
κp = [2,500bn + 2,500bn × (-0.23)] – (2,500bn × 0.4) = 925bn 
 
With the relatively high inflation of 7% 
κip =  [2,500bn + 2,500bn × (-0.23)] – [(2,500bn × 0.4)+(2,500bn × 0.07)] = 750Bn 
 
 
Country B (higher developed) 
 
κp = [2,500bn + 2,500bn × (-0.23)] – (2,500bn × 0.28) = 1,225bn 
 
With the relatively high inflation of  2% 
κip =  [2,500bn + 2,500bn × (-0.23)] – [(2,500bn × 0.28)+(2,500bn × 0.02)] = 1,175bn 
 
 
With a 10 % growth of investment rates the worth of the economy will be:  
 
Country A (less developed) 
κp = [2,500bn + 2,500bn × 0.1)] – (2,500bn × 0.4) = 1,750bn 
 
With the relatively high inflation of  7% 
κip =  [2,500bn + 2,500bn × 0.1)] – [(2,500bn × 0.4)+(2,500bn × 0.07)] = 1,575bn 
 
Country B (higher developed) 
 
κp = [2,500bn + 2,500bn × 0.1)] – (2,500bn × 0.28) = 2,050bn 
 
With the relatively high inflation of  2% 
κip =  [2,500bn + 2,500bn × 0.1)] – [(2,500bn × 0.28)+(2,500bn × 0.02)] = 2,000bn 
 
The comparison shows clearly the advantage, since both economies would be equal at 
2,500bn GDP, at any inflation, any investment rates, and any inequality in the society.  
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With the differentiation with social expenditure pressures, a relativization is already no-
ticeable. 
(1-G)B = 1,500bn undeveloped Economy 
(1-G)B= 1,800bn developed Economy 
 
It does still lack of the important future aspect though. With Capital Investment Factor 
and Inflation, the undeveloped nation would be worth:  
750bn in economic shock / 1,575bn in prosperity 
And the highly developed nation would be worth  
1,225bn in economic shock / 2000bn in prosperity.  
 
This is a significant advantage compared to the current measurements of the economic 
rankings.  
4.2 Example Productivity κ_PROD or κ_PROD_Infl. 
κ_Index / Labor Force = κ_PROD 
κ_Index_Infl. / Labor Force = κ_PROD_Infl. 
 
Productivity county A (with inflation) 
κ_PROD_Infl.  = 1,325bn Euro / 42m =  31,547 Euro per Capita  
Productivity country B (with inflation) 
κ_PROD_Infl.  = 1,725bn Euro / 42m =  41,071 Euro per Capita 
Productivity country USA level (with inflation)   
κ_Index_Infl. = (1 – 0.49 – 0.032) x 11,363bn Euro = 5,431bn Euro 
κ_PROD_Infl. = 5,431bn Euro / 142m Labor Force =  38,250 Euro per Capita 
Productivity country China level (with inflation)   
κ_Index_Infl. = (1 – 0.47 – 0.054) x 6,230bn Euro = 2,965bn Euro  
κ_PROD_Infl. =2,965bn Euro / 802m Labor Force = 3,697 Euro per Capita 
  
The new numbers of productivity are generally lower. 
5 Criticism 
5.1 Generalized Gini coefficients  
The argument that there could be overlappings with the Generalized Ginis64 or K-Theory 
from the Axiomatic Index-Theory65 was critically checked. Generalized Ginis try for in-
stance to include the multidimensionality of wellbeing measurement into aggregated re-
                                                 
64
 Weymark J.A. (1981): Generalized Gini inequality indices,/ Index verified after a recommendation from 
a German Professor, Prof. Dr. Kuhn from TU-Chemnitz  
65
 Brown, L.G./ Pedersen, G.K. (2014): Non-stable K-theory and extremally rich C*-algebras, P. 262-298 / 
Pennig, U.(2014):  Twisted K-theory and obstructions against positive scalar curvature metrics,Journal of 
K-Theory, 
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fined Gini coefficients66. The models in this paper are not modified Gini coefficients. 
There are no resemblances to Generalized Ginis or mathematical K-Theory despite the 
letter K or κ (Kappa) in the Formulas. The Economic models of this paper show a GDP 
that deducts long-term frozen up assets over the social pressures axiom and introduce a 
future aspect into the GDP. The S-Ginis or other variants of modernized Generalized Gini 
coefficients could be implemented later.     
 
5.2 Relevance in the reality of the Economies 
Does it matter how realistically you relativize the GDP downwards, and how adequate 
the new picture is, when all that matters is the de-facto nominal GDP (and therefore 
spending power) that has been generated? Does it matter when the Governments still can 
make debts and simply cover the new economic model ranking with debt spending? 
Therefore, does it matter when you downgrade for instance a raw materials exporting 
economy, when all that counts is the nominal cash the economy generates, i.e. the ability 
to pay off its debts (including reserves in foreign currency)?  
 
A debt-to- κ_Index_Infl. ratio will always be worse (higher) than the classical debt-to-
GDP ratio. How relevant can the Index therefore be, when used to measure debt ratios? A 
sinking κ_Index_Infl. (maybe due to worsening Gini or Inflation) just warns the econo-
mists sooner about internal problems in the economy/ society (that might or might not be 
addressed/quelled). The less easily a democracy can cut into social transfers, the more 
sense this index makes. 
 
Is a relativization of 1 Trillion Euro in a 2.5 Trillion Euro economy, which has a high 
Gini coefficient value, or a relativization of 700 Billion Euro in a similar sized economy 
with a low Gini coefficient value “overkill-downgrading”? This means a relativization of 
28-40%  depends on whether the Gini coefficient is 0.28 or 0.40. Chapter 2.2 and 2.3 ex-
plain the rational behind the pick67, but it might be controversial if the height of these 
transfer payments justifies the height of the GDP relativizations, even if these amounts 
are factually frozen up.  
 
5.3 The Factors chosen 
As for the Gini coefficient, a lower Gini coefficient means only a more equal income dis-
tribution, but it says nothing about the level of income. When all are equally poor, the 
Gini is low. This however would only be likely in a low GDP nation, a high GDP with a 
good income distribution is a very good sign in contrary. Inequality might not be a static 
                                                 
66
 Weymark J.A.  / Gaidos T. (2005): Multidimensional generalized Gini indices, p.471-496 
67
 Public social spending + pensions freeze up factually a part of the GDP already 
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variable. This means that Inequality caused by massive increase of income of a few, does 
not necessarily mean that the other households have a reduced in come.  
 
As for the productivity Index κ_PROD or κ_PROD_Infl., a lowered Gini coefficient (ine-
quality gets better) is technically not a productivity increase, the same with a lowered In-
flation rate. On the other hand, the classical productivity index is also “just a theoretical 
value”, which includes distortions from the upper 10% of income.   
 
A professor68 mentioned that not all nations might see inequality as a bad thing. I agree 
that for instance Calvinistic societies69 might tolerate inequality more than European 
economies, but the general acceptance of the Gini coefficient makes this worry irrelevant. 
The formula uses the Gini coefficient, and a high Gini coefficient value is not accepted as 
a positive factor in an economy generally. A very abstract professor70 argued that the pick 
of the factors could be seen as arbitrary, even if mixing indicators is not uncommon in 
economical sciences. The indicator sets a very clear goal, namely increased realism or re-
ality based adjustment of the GDP while still staying practical enough. This predestined 
only the highly aggregated factors. Chapter 2.2 and 2.3 describes with references to 
Stiglitz71 why the pick is not as arbitrary72 as it might seem.  
 
No one can predict the future, and this is a valid criticism. Including the future aspect into 
the GDP over the change in the variables of Capex or Priv. Investments could be seen as 
anticipation. However, anticipation is common in economics over a large variety of indi-
ces, though it could be seen as blunt betting how the GDP would develop if for instance 
Investment Rates fall.  
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
The Social factors relativized GDP is the basis for a variety of more realistic economical 
indicators73, including productivity and debt-ratios. Cutting out that part of the GDP, 
which is financially long term reserved for social transfers74, is the basis of these models. 
For this purpose, the Gini coefficient is most suitable, since it tries to measure75 the basis 
of the transfer payments, the income inequality. Out of practicability, reasons of the new 
Indices only highly aggregated factors were suitable. 
 
                                                 
68
 Prof. Dr. Hayo from University Marburg 
69
 USA/ UK and Anglo-American influenced 
70
 Prof. Dr. Koerber-Weik (retired) from University of applied Sciences Nuertingen 
71
 Stiglitz J.E./ Sen A./ Fitoussi J.-P. (2009): Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress,p.29 
72
 As it might seem 
73
 Scientific gain 
74
 “financially long term frozen up part of the GDP” 
75
 Statistical adequacy in mind 
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The Gini coefficient and the factor of Inflation are interdependent if realism adjustment 
of GDP is the goal, especially in relation to good governance measurement. Countries 
with a high-income inequality and a high inflation rate are downgraded strongly, while 
countries with a low Gini coefficient and a low inflation rate are relativized down only by 
a small margin. The new models allow sooner identification of instabilities and problems 
in economies, and revise economic rankings of nations. 
 
The κ_Index or κ_Index_infl. “repairs” some of the weaknesses of the classical GDP, 
while relying on established and commonly acknowledged factors and methods of meas-
urement. The κ_Index or κ_Index_Infl. is axiomatic, but it cannot be questioned by its 
coherent logical construction, only by its relevance when debt making covers rankings of 
economies and when used in debt-ratios (where only the nominal financial credit gener-
ated counts, with or without possible foreign currency reserves).  
 
The comparisons in the ideal-typical examples of chapter 4 show clearly the advantage of 
the new model. Two economies with different basic traits have the same level of GDP, 
and would be perceived as equal by current GDP modelling (at the level of 2,500bn 
GDP). With the differentiation just over the social expenditure pressures, a significant re-
lativization is already noticeable. 
(1-G)B = 1,500bn undeveloped Economy 
(1-G)B= 1,800bn developed Economy 
 
With the introduction of the future aspects over the change of the factors of Capital In-
vestments or Private Investments (with or without Inflation) the less developed nation 
would be worth (instead 2,500bn):  
 
750bn in economic shock / 1,575bn in prosperity, and the highly developed nation would 
be worth 1,225bn in economic shock / 2000bn in prosperity.  
 
Both nations would be equal without this model, and the negative or positive externalities 
following in the near term (due to investment rates) would not be present. This marks a 
significant advantage over the current measurements of the economic rankings.  
 
One of the two digression models suggest that intensified free trade is the solution for the 
problems, which occur when a nation cannot downgrade its currency (for instance having 
joined a single currency system like the EURO). The second digression model helps iden-
tifying Government overheads, a source for multiple crises in the past and in the future 
(like the Argentina crisis of the recent decades).   
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